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The  striking  feature  of debt  contracts  is that  over 
a wide  range  of  circumstances  the  payment  is fixed 
and  invariant,  although  occasionally,  as in a default, 
less  than  the  full  payment  is made.  In  this  article  I 
offer  a simple  explanation  for why  such  arrangements 
are  widely  observed.  The  explanation  relies  on  re- 
cent  advances  in the  theory  of financial  arrangements 
under  imperfect  information.  I  will  argue  that  the 
opportunity  for  borrowers  to  hide  their  future 
resources  sharply  constrains  the  degree  to which  loan 
repayment  can be  made  contingent  on the  borrower’s 
future  resources. 
From  one  point  of view  it is not  obvious  that  the 
ubiquity  of  debt  contracts  is  a puzzle.  A borrower 
acquires  a sum  of  money  today  that  will  be  repaid 
in the  future,  along with  an additional  payment,  called 
interest.  The  interest  rate  is the  price  for  the  tem- 
porary  use  of  resources.  It  seems  perfectly  natural 
that  this  amount  is  predetermined. 
Modern  economic  theory  has  taught  us  to  view 
matters  differently.  When  a loan  is made,  the  lender 
acquires  a  contingent claim,  a  promise  by  the 
borrower  to  pay  an  amount  that  can  depend  in any 
arbitrary,  prespecified  way  on  future  events.  l Many 
familiar  contracts  actually  do involve  future  payments 
that  are contingent  in significant  ways.  Insurance  con- 
tracts  are  promises  to  make  a payment  contingent 
on  some  particular  future  loss.  Partnership  agree- 
ments  and  profit-sharing  arrangements  make  future 
payments  contingent  on  the  uncertain  profits  of 
the  firm.  Traded  securities  such  as  stocks,  bonds, 
options,  and  related  derivative  products  have  returns 
that  are  highly  sensitive  to  future  events.  But  in  a 
debt  contract,  the  payment  is generally  noncontingent 
in  that  the  amount  does  not  vary  with  future  cir- 
cumstances,  such  as the  borrower’s  wealth.  Of course 
a debt  contract  is contingent  to  the  extent  that  the 
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r Flood  (199 1) provides  an  accessible  introduction  to  models 
of  contingent  claims. 
lender  does  not  receive  full repayment  if the  borrower 
defaults.  But although  default  is an important  feature 
of  the  arrangement,  it  occurs  relatively  rarely. 
Finding  plausible  models  in  which  people  agree 
to  debt  contracts,  although  they  are  allowed  to 
agree  to  any possible  contingent  repayment  schedule, 
has  proven  surprisingly  difficult.  In  fact,  in  many 
models  ‘people  are much  better  off with  a contingent 
contract  than  they  are  with  a  debt  contract.  In 
Section  I,  I present  a simple,  two-agent  model  that 
shows  why  standard  economic  theory  predicts  that 
contracts  generally  should  be contingent.  The  model 
also  serves  as  a  useful  starting  point  for  further 
analysis. 
In Section  II,  I present  a model  in which  the  bor- 
rower  and  lender  agree  to  a loan  repayment  that  is 
noncontingent  because  the  borrower  can  conceal 
future  resources.  Section  III points  out that  this model 
is deficient  because  nothing  resembling  default  ever 
occurs,  and  then  argues  that  collateral,  broadly 
defined,  is an important  omitted  feature  of the  model. 
Next,  in  Section  IV,  I present  a model  in which  an 
implicitly  collateralized  debt  contract,  with occasional 
default,  is the  chosen  arrangement.  Three  brief  sec- 
tions  conclude  the  paper:  Section  V surveys  literature 
that  has  addressed  the  same  question;  Section  VI 
briefly  discusses  some  policy  implications:  and 
Section  VII summarizes  the  explanation  offered  here 
for  the  ubiquity  of  debt  contracts  and  notes  two 
remaining  unsolved  puzzles. 
I. ASIMPLEMODEL 
OFCONTINGENT  CLAIMS 
To  begin,  consider  an  economy  with  only  two 
people:  a borrower  and  a lender.  The  economy  lasts 
for just  two  time  periods;  call them  periods  1 and  2. 
Imagine  that  the  two  people  are  farmers,  and  that 
the  two  periods  represent  the  spring  and  fall  of  a 
given  year.  In the  spring  the  lender  harvests  a crop: 
wheat,  say.  The  lender’s  land  produces  no  crop  in 
the  fall. The  borrower’s  land produces  no crop  in the 
spring,  but will produce  a crop  in the  fall. Both  agents 
would  like  to  consume  wheat  in both  the  spring  and 
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of  wheat  in  the  spring,  to  be  repaid  from  the  pro- 
ceeds  of the  fall harvest.  For  simplicity,  I ignore  the 
use  of wheat  in planting,  and  assume  that  the  crops 
have already  been  planted.  I also ignore the possibility 
of storing  wheat  from  the  spring  to  the  fall; allowing 
storage  would  not  affect  the  results.  No  other  goods 
are  available  to  these  two  agents. 
To  make  the  contingent  nature  of the  contract  of 
interest,  some  random  event  has  to  occur  between 
spring  and fall. I assume  that  in the  spring the  amount 
of the  borrower’s  fall wheat  harvest  is uncertain.  In 
the  fall the  harvest  is realized,  and  both  agents  learn 
the  exact  value  of  the  harvest.  The  payment  con- 
tract  is contingent  if it depends  on the  amount  of the 
borrower’s  crop.  Other  sources  of uncertainty  could 
have  been  considered-shocks  to the  preferences  of 
the  two  agents  for  example-but  in  many  ways, 
uncertainty  concerning  the  borrower’s  ex  post 
resources  is the  archetypal  setting  for financial  con- 
tracting.  If the  borrower  is a wage  earner,  for exam- 
ple,  future  income  or  employment  might  be  uncer- 
tain.  If the  borrower  is an  individual  entrepreneur, 
future  returns  from  the  venture  might  be uncertain. 
If the  borrower  is an incorporated  firm,  future  liquid 
resources  of  the  firm  might  be  uncertain. 
To  proceed,  the  borrower’s  harvest  in  the  fall is 
8, and can take  on one  of N values:  &,&,.  . .,&,  where 
these  are  ordered  so  that  O<r3i<&<  . . . ~t9r.r.~ In 
the  spring,  both  people  believe  that  the  probability 
that  8 takes  on  the  value  8,  is ?m, where  ?m > 0 for 
n=  l,Z,...,  N,  and  C?=  rnn  =  1.  The  lender  has  a 
harvest  of e? in the  spring.  The  lender  makes  a loan 
advance  of q in the  spring,  and  receives  a payment 
of y,, in the  fall if the  harvest  is 8,.  In the  spring  the 
lender’s  consumption  is et  -9,  while  the  borrower’s 
spring consumption  is q. When  the borrower’s  harvest 
is  8,,  the  lender’s  fall  consumption  is  y,,  and  the 
borrower’s  fall consumption  8, - y,,. A contract is 
a set  of payments  {q,yI,y2,...,yN),  and  these  com- 
pletely  determine  the  consumptions  of  the  two 
agents. 
I assume  that  the  borrower  evaluates  the  contract 
flmJ;Y..Y  yN)  according  to  the  expected  utility 
UBh)  +  k$UB&-Ynh  (1) 
2 For  there  to  be  a  meaningful  distinction  between  a  debt 
contract  with  occasional  default  and  a more  general  contingent 
contract,  I need  at least  three  states.  The  notational  burden  of 
N  states  is  not  significantly  greater. 
where  fl is a discount  factor  satisfying  0  <  p  <  1. 
This  is the  ex  ante  expected  utility  of the  borrower 
in the  spring.  Similarly,  the  lender  evaluates  the  con- 
tract  according  to  the  expected  utility  function 
u&I  -  9)  +  Pn~l~~(Yn)~n.  (2) 
The  within-period  utility  functions  Un and  UL are 
assumed  to  be  strictly  increasing,  continuous,  con- 
cave  and  smoothly  differentiable. 
Contracts  cannot  require  payments  that  exceed  the 
available  resources.  Stated  formally,  contracts  must 
satisfy  the  following  resource  feasibility 
constraints: 
q20,.  (3) 
e4  2  9,  (4) 
Yn  2  0,  n=1,‘2  ,..., N,  (5) 
en  2  Y,,  n=  1,2 ,..., N.  (6) 
Optimal  Contracts 
To  obtain  predictions  in this  simple  environment 
about  the  arrangements  that  the  two  agents  will 
choose,  I  restrict  attention  to  optimal  contracts. 
A  contract  is optimal if it  is feasible  and  no  other 
feasible  contract  exists  that  makes  one  agent  better 
off,  in  terms  of  ex  ante  expected  utility,  without 
making  the  other  agent  worse  off.  Because  of  the 
simple  nature  of  the  environment,  an  easy  way  of 
finding  optimal  contracts  is  by  maximizing  the 
weighted  average  of the  two  agents’  utility  functions, 
subject  to  the  resource  feasibility  constraints.  The 
weights,  sometimes  called  “Pareto  weights,”  are 
arbitrary  positive  numbers,  and varying  their  relative 
size  traces  out  a range  of contracts  that  gives  more 
utility  to  one  agent  and  less  to  the  other.  If a con- 
tract  is  optimal  in  this  environment,  then  it  is  the 
solution  to the  constrained  maximization  problem  for 
some  Pareto  weights,  and  vice  versa. 
The  programming  problem  that  finds optimal  con- 
tracts,  then,  is  the  following. 
Problem  1: 
Maximize,  by  choice  of  q,yi,ya,.  . .,yN, 
XB  UB(d  +  k#$dkYdTn 
[  1 
[ 
N 
+  XL uL(e4-q)  +  S~~Iu~(yJ.rr~  1 
subject  to the resource  feasibility constraints  (3)-(6). 
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To  show  the  properties  of  optimal  contracts,  I 
examine  the  set  of  first-order  conditions  that  are 
necessary  and  sufficient  for  a contract  to  be  a solu- 
tion  to  Problem  1.  If  both  the  borrower  and  the 
lender  are enjoying  positive  consumption  in the  fall 
for a given  state  8,,  so that  0<  y,,<  8,,  then  the  first- 
order  condition  for  y,,  is 
AL’d  (yn)  =  hBU$  (en  -  yn)  .  (7) 
Condition  (7) requires  that  the  marginal  utility  of the 
lender’s  fall consumption,  scaled  by  XL, must  equal 
the  marginal  utility  of the  borrower’s  fall consump- 
tion,  scaled  by  XB. This  condition  determines  y,, in 
a manner  illustrated  in  Figure  1. The  width  of the 
box  in Figure  1 is t9,, the  realized  harvest  outcome 
to be divided  between  the  two  agents.  The  payment 
yn  is  measured  horizontally  from  left  to  right,  and 
the  lender’s  marginal  utility,  measured  vertically,  falls 
as  y,,  rises.  Similarly,  the  consumption  of  the  bor- 
rower  is measured  horizontally  from  right  to left,  and 
the  borrower’s  marginal  utility  rises  as yn rises.  The 
optimality  condition  (7)  dictates  that  the  payment 
is determined  by the intersection  of the  two weighted 
marginal  utilities.  Identical  conditions  apply  for every 
other  possible  harvest  outcome;  the horizontal  dimen- 
sions  of  the  box  vary  with  en,  but  otherwise  the 
analysis  is  the  same. 
The  Nonoptimality  of Debt  Contracts 
I can  now  demonstrate  that  in this simple  environ- 
ment,  the payment varies positively with the &west, 
and a debt contract  will be optimai ody  under special 
chumstances. Consider  Figure  2, in which  the  deter- 
mination  of  the  payments  is  illustrated,  just  as  in 
Figure  1, but  for two  possible  harvest  outcomes,  8, 
and 8,,  where  m > n. The  box  for the  larger  harvest, 
8,,  is drawn  with  the  same left edge,  so that the origin 
from  which  the  payments  are  measured  does  not 
move.  Consequently,  the  lender’s  marginal  utility 
schedule  is the  same  for both  harvest  outcomes.  The 
origin  from  which  the  borrower’s  consumption  is 
measured  shifts  to the  right,  because  8,  >&,  so the 
borrower’s  marginal  utility  shifts  to the  right.  If both 
marginal  utility  schedules  slope  down,  the  point  of 
intersection  moves  down  and to the  right  going  from 
harvest  en to 8,.  Therefore,  the  payment  ym for the 
larger  harvest  is larger  than  yn,  the  payment  for the 
smaller  harvest. 
Figure  1 
THE  DETERMINATION  OF  FALL  PAYMENTS 
FOR  A  GIVEN  HARVEST,  8” 
Lender’s  Marginal 
Borrower’s  Marginal 
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Figure  2 
THE  DETERMINATION  OF  FALL  PAYMENTS 
FOR  HARVESTS  19.  AND  e,,  WHERE  e,>e, 
t 
x,u;(y”) =  x,u;(Y,) 
4  x$&v&-Y,) 
I  I 
I  I 
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0  Yn  Ym  4 
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Under  a  debt  contract  there  is  a  set  of  harvest 
outcomes  over  which  the  payment  made  by  the 
borrower  in  the  fall is  a constant.  It  is easy  to  see 
what  is required  for  such  an  arrangement  to  satisfy 
the  optimality  conditions.  The  lender’s  optimal  con- 
sumption  must  remain  the  same,  and  this  requires 
that  the  marginal  utility  curve  for  the  borrower  be 
horizontal,  as in Figure  3. This  in turn  requires  that 
the  borrower  be  risk  neutral,  meaning  that  the  bor- 
rower’s  utility  is linear,  not  strictly  concave.  In  this 
case  a shift  to  the  right  in  the  borrower’s  marginal 
utility  leaves  the  point  of intersection,  and  thus  the 
payment  to  the  lender,  unchanged.  For a debt con- 
n‘act  to be optimal  in tIni  envhvnment, the beer  must 
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THE  DETERMINATION  OF  FALL  PAYMENTS 
FOR  HARVESTS  8” AND  8,  WHEN 
THE  BORROWER  IS  RISK  NEUTRAL 
x,u;(e,  -  Y,) 
be  rid  neutral,  and  the lender must be  rid  averse.3 
This  situation  is  highly  implausible.4 
This  simple  model  highlights  the  basic  principle 
that  if people  face  contingencies  that  are observable 
when  they  occur,  then  only  under  very  unusual 
circumstances  would  they  choose  noncontingent 
arrangements.  In  general  we  should  expect  to  see 
contracts  that  are contingent  on any future  event  that 
affects  the  marginal  utilities  of  the  contracting 
parties,  such  as  shocks  to  the  wealth  of  either  party. 
For  example,  under  perfect  information,  as here,  we 
should  observe  agents  insured  against  idiosyncratic 
shocks  to their  own  wealth  by  sharing  risk with  other 
agents  in  the  economy.  Notably,  a  wide  range  of 
models  share  this  property.  The  example  economy 
I  have  described  is  merely  a  special  case  of  the 
classical  general  equilibrium  model  of Arrow  (195 1) 
and Debreu  (19.59), extended  to allow for uncertainty 
as  in  Chapter  7 in  Debreu,  or  Arrow  (1964).  The 
principle  survives  in the  most  general  specifications 
3 The  case  in  which  both  the  borrower  and  the  lender  are 
risk  neutral  can  be  ignored.  If the  two  weighted  marginal  utility 
schedules  do  not  intersect,  then  the  entire  harvest  is given  to 
one  agent  in  every  state.  If  the  two  weighted  marginal  utility 
schedules  coincide,  contractual  arrangements  are indeterminate. 
4 This  seems  implausible  for  at  least  three  reasons.  First,  risk 
neutrality  seems  inconsistent  with  a  wide  array  of  observed 
arrangements  for  shedding  or  dispersing  risk.  Second,  a large 
class  of  the  population  (all debtors)  is  not  likely  to  have  such 
special  preferences.  In  fact,  casual  introspection  suggests  that 
borrowers  are  not  systematically  less  risk  averse  than  lenders, 
and,  if anything,  they  are  subject  to  more  idiosyncratic  risk  than 
lenders,  as  in  the  model  presented  here.  Third,  in  many 
economic  models  the  assumption  of risk  neutrality  is  made  to 
capture  an  agent’s  ability  to  insure  against  idiosyncratic  risk  in 
perfect  capital  markets.  One  would  expect,  however,  that  lenders 
rather  than  borrowers  would  have  such  privileged  access. 
of  the  classical  model,  at  least  when  there  are  no 
imperfections  in the  availability  of information.  Thus, 
the ubiquity  of debt  contracts  is puzzling,  at least from 
the  viewpoint  of classical general  equilibrium  models. 
II.  DEBTCONTRACTS 
INAMODELWITHLIMITEDINFORMATION 
Apparently,  then,  to  explain  debt  contracts  one 
must  depart  from  the  assumptions  of  the  classical 
model.  In  the  example  above,  both  the  lender  and 
the  borrower  are fully  aware  of the  realized  value  of 
the  borrower’s  harvest;  in  other  words,  there  is 
perfect information.  Suppose  instead  that  the 
lender  is uncertain  of the  borrower’s  harvest  at the 
time  the  payment  must  be  made  in  the  fall.  The 
lender  might  be  forced  to  rely  on  the  borrower’s 
report  about  the  harvest,  especially  if  there  is  no 
independent  information  available  to  the  lender.  In 
this  case  the  payment  might  have  to  be  noncontin- 
gent,  because  otherwise  the  borrower  would  have 
reason  to  make  a misleading  and  self-serving  report. 
To  explore  this  notion,  I now  modify  the  model 
described  above  by  assuming  that  the  borrower  is 
capable  of  hiding  any  amount  of  the  harvest.  The 
hidden  crop  can  be  consumed  secretly,  and  hiding 
is itself  costless.  The  remaining  crop,  the  part  not 
hidden,  is  displayed  to  the  lender.  This  is  less 
stringent  than  assuming  that  the  lender  is incapable 
of observing  the  harvest  at all (pure  private  informa- 
tion),  but  still implies  that  the  amount  displayed  pro- 
vides  only  a lower  bound  on  the  actual  amount  of 
the  harvest.5 
This  appears  to  be  a fairly  realistic  imperfection 
in information.  Often  a borrower  can divert  resources 
for private  benefit  that  would  otherwise  be available 
to repay  an obligation.  A consumer,  for example,  can 
spend  freely on current  consumption  and then  default 
on  debts.6  Similarly,  a  firm’s  managers  can  divert 
5 This  assumption  is a version  of “costly  state  falsification”  (see 
Lacker  and  Weinberg,  1989).  Costly  state  falsification  is  the 
assumption  that  one  agent  can  misrepresent  the  true  state  at 
some  cost.  Perfect  information,  as in the  example  in the  previous 
section.  is a soecial  case  in which  all falsification  is orohibitivelv 
1  , 
costly.  Pure  private  information  is the  assumption  that  the  agent 
can  costlessly  make  any state  appear  to have  been  realized.  The 
assumption  made  here  is that  the  borrower-can  costlessly  make 
it appear  that  any  lower  harvest  has  occurred,  but  it is prohibi- 
tively  costly  to make  it appear  that  a larger  harvest  has  occurred. 
6 An  individual  can  spend  on consumption  just  prior  to filing for 
bankruptcy,  depleting  liquid  assets  to the  detriment  of creditors, 
both  in  a Chapter  7 liquidation  and  in  a Chapter  13 plan.  In 
addition,  the  consumer  can use funds  to purchase  “exempt  assets” 
that  are  then  beyond  the  reach  of  creditors. 
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indirect  managerial  compensation,  wasteful  invest- 
ment,  exploitation  of  discretion  over  accounting 
choices,  or favored  treatment  of particular  creditor 
classes.7  Often  a  lender  has  no  direct  knowledge 
of a borrower’s  total  resources  and  thus  must  rely  on 
the  borrower’s  own  financial  statements.  At the  same 
time,  it often  seems  as if lenders  have  or can  obtain 
some  information  about  a borrower.  If a borrower 
claims  to  have  a certain  quantity  of  resources,  the 
lender  can  ask  the  borrower  for  proof  of  his  bank 
balance  or  other  readily  verifiable  assets.  The  bor- 
rower  is incapable  of proving  that  he  does  not con- 
trol  additional  assets;  he  can  display  less  than  his 
true  resources  but  not  more.  This  informational 
imperfection  is consistent  with  the  observation  that 
parties  to financial  arrangements  are often  observed 
exchanging  information  at  relatively  little  apparent 
cost.8 
Incentive Constraints 
Although  the  implication  of  this  informational 
assumption  is  straightforward,  I  display  the  results 
more  formally,  since  in a more  complicated  setting 
examined  later  the  intuition  will be less clear and the 
formalities  more  important.  The  borrower  now  has 
a choice  to  make  in the  fall: if the  harvest  is &,  the 
borrower  can  display  an  amount  em, where  8,  can 
take  on the values &,&, . . . ,&.  If the borrower  displays 
8,  when  the  harvest  is 8,,  nothing  is being  hidden, 
while  if the  borrower  displays  less than  8,,  an amount 
8,  -8,  is being  hidden  and  consumed  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  lender. 
As before,  a contract,  (q,yl,yz  ,..., yN}, specifies  the 
spring  payment  to the  borrower,  q,  and  the  fall pay- 
ment  from  the  borrower,  y,,,  contingent  on  the 
harvest.  Also  as before,  a contract  must  satisfy  the 
resource  feasibility  constraints  (3)-(6).  Now  I impose 
the  further  condition,  called  incentive feasibility, 
that  the  borrower  never  has  an incentive  to hide  any 
of  the  harvest.  If  the  borrower  does  not  hide  any 
harvest  when  the  harvest  is  en,.  his  utility  is 
u&L-y,,).  If  the  borrower  displays  Brn when  the 
harvest  is &,, hiding  the  amount  8, -em,  his  utility 
is u&&  -  y,).  For  the  borrower  to  have  no  positive 
incentive  to  hide  harvest,  it  must  be  true  that 
UB(&-yn)  2  UB(f&yrn).  Therefore,  the  set  of 
incentive feasibility constraints are 
UB(on  -  yn)  2  UB(&  -  yti) 
for  n=Z,...,  N,  and  for  m=l,...,  n-1.  (8) 
The  incentive  feasibility  constraints  stated  here  can 
be derived  from  a deeper  formulation  that  allows con- 
tracts  that  might  give the  borrower  incentive  to hide 
some  of the  harvest.  It can  be  shown,  however,  that 
the  results  of any  arbitrary  contract  can be replicated 
by  a contract  that  satisfies  the  incentive  feasibility 
constraints.9 
The  incentive  feasibility  constraints  can  be 
simplified.  To  use  (8) in finding  an optimal  contract, 
the  utility  of  not  hiding  any  harvest  must  be  com- 
pared  to the utility  of displaying  any amount  less than 
8,.  It  turns  out  that  if the  constraint  for  harvest  8, 
is  satisfied  for  m =n  -  1,  then  the  constraints  are 
satisfied  for all m<  n. As a result  (8) can  be  reduced 
to 
UB(&-Yn)  2  UB&-Yn-1) 
for  n=Z,...,N.  (9) 
In  other  words,  the  utility  of  telling  the  truth  only 
needs  to  be  compared  to  the  temptation  of display- 
ing  the  next  smallest  possible  harvest  &,-1.1o 
An immediate  implication  of (9) is that  a contract  is 
incentive  feasible  if  and  only  if  yn  is  constant  or 
decreasing  as  8,  increases.  For  any  given  harvest 
outcome,  the  borrower  can  make  the  payment  cor- 
responding  to that  harvest  or to  any  smaller  harvest; 
a  given  payment  is  feasible  for  the  corresponding 
harvest  and for any  larger  harvest  outcome.  Because 
7  There  are many constraints  on these abilities,  of course.  Boards 
of directors,  or other  representatives  of creditors,  monitor  some 
aspects  of  managerial  choice.  Discretion  over  accounting  is 
limited  in  myriad  ways  by  accounting  standards,  legal  re- 
quirements  for certification  by outside  auditors  and  the  like. The 
fraudulent  conveyance  provision  of the  bankruptcy  code  allows 
the  bankruptcy  court  to “unwind”  distributions  to creditors  made 
90 days  or less  prior  to filing. Nonetheless,  managers  retain  con- 
siderable  discretion  and can often  take actions  for personal  benefit 
to  the  detriment  of  creditors. 
s In  contrast,  such  readily  available  observation  is  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  pure  private  information,  where  it is assumed  that 
the  information  is  completely  unavailable  to  the  lender. 
9 The  proof  is in  Appendix  A  and  uses  “The  Revelation  Prin- 
cinle.”  The  terminologv  is  due  to  Mverson  (1979).  For  an 
1  VI 
exposition  of  the  Revelation  Principle’in  similar  seitings  see 
Townsend  (1988).  A  warning  is  in  order  here,  however;  the 
display  of  harvest  is  an  “action”  and  not  a “message.”  In  the 
present  setting  the  distinction  is immaterial,  but  in more  general 
settings  in  which  actions  involve  real  costs,  the  distinction  is 
important.  See  Lacker  and  Weinberg  (1989),  p.  1350. 
*OTo  prove  this  note  that  (9)  implies  that  for  n=2,3,...,N, 
y,SyA,  so  YnSYm  for m= 12 ,...in  -  1. This  in  turn  implies 
that  (8)  is  satisfied.  The  property  that  only  immediately 
adjacei;  incentive  constraints  ieeh  to be checked-arises  in a widk 
variety  of  settings. 
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the  smallest  possible  payment  and  will  display  the 
corresponding  amount  of harvest.  Thus  the  borrower 
will never  have  to make  a larger  payment  for a larger 
harvest  than  for  a  smaller  harvest. 
Optimal&y of a Debt  Contract 
I  am  now  in  a  position  to  show  that  something 
resembling  a debt  contract  is optimal  in this  model. 
As before,  a programming  problem  is solved,  but with 
the  addition  now  of  the  incentive-feasibility  con- 
straints  (9).  Specifically,  I  solve 
Problem  2: 
Maximize,  by  choice  of  q,yl,...,  yN, 




+  XL  UdeF-q),  +  Pn~lU~(ynhn  1 
subject  to  the  resource  feasibility  constraints  (3)- 
(6),  and  the  incentive  feasibility  constraints  (9). 
To  see  why  a completely  noncontingent  contract 
is  optimal,  compare  the  incentive  feasibility  con- 
straints  with  the  contract  that  was  optimal  in  Sec- 
tion  I.  First,  recall  that  incentive-feasible  contracts 
can  never  be  increasing  with  respect  to  the  harvest 
8,,  only  constant  or decreasing,  because  if yn  >  y,i 
and  the  harvest  is  0,,  then  the  borrower  would  lie 
in order  to  make  a smaller  payment.  Second,  recall 
that  in Section  I, without  incentive  constraints,  risk- 
sharing  alone  determined  the  optimal  contract  and 
it had a strictly increasing  payment  schedule.  But such 
a contract  is not  incentive  feasible,  and would  always 
give  the  borrower  an  incentive  to  claim  that  the 
smallest  possible  harvest  outcome  had  occurred. 
Among  the  set  of contracts  that  are nonincreasing- 
and  thus  incentive  feasible-the  constant  payment 
schedule  is the  one  that  is closest  to the  optimal  con- 
tract  from  Section  1  in the  sense  that  it has the  largest 
slope.  Thus  a  contract  with  a  constant  payment 
schedule  is  optimal.” 
rr To  complete  a  proof,  I  need  to  show  that  a  contract  with 
yn  <  y,r  for  some  n  cannot  be  optimal.  Suppose  that  yn  < 
y,-1  for  some  particular  n.  Then  the  incentive  constraint  that 
relates  yn and  yn-r is not  binding,  and  &,  =  0,  where  &  is the 
Lagrange  multiplier  on the  nth constraint  in (9). Therefore,  from 
the  first-order  conditions  we  have 
P[Xrui(yn-1)  -  XBd(b-I  -yn-dbrrl-1 
=  UFml-I-yn-Ih-1  2  0 
A noteworthy  feature  of this model  is that  the  range 
of  contracts  available  to  the  two  agents  is severely 
restricted.  Because  the  payment,  call  it R,  is cons- 
tant  across  harvests,  &payment  can never be greater 
than tlrre  smdfesstpossib/e  &west  (R  5  01); otherwise 
the  fixed  payment  is not  feasible  for small  harvests. 
This  is potentially  a quite  severe  restriction,  since 
the  smallest  possible  harvest  could  be very  different 
from  the  expected  realization,  and  could 
imply  a maximum  loan  repayment  that  is very  small. 
In this  situation,  the  borrower  might  be left desiring 
more  credit  than  he  can  obtain  via  any  incentive- 
feasible  contract.  To  see  this,  one  can  combine  the 
first-order  conditions  from  Problem  2 to  obtain  the 
following  equation  linking  the  expected  intertemporal 
marginal  rates  of  substitution  of  the  two  agents: 
;  pud(en-yn)7h  =  z  PULYY~G 
n=l 
wi(q)  n=l uLr(et -4) 
+  AB$q)  (10) 
The  left  side  of  (10)  is  the  borrower’s  expected 
intertemporal  marginal  rate  of  substitution:  the  ex- 
pected  value  of the  ratio  of marginal  utility  in period 
2 to  marginal  utility  in period  1.  Similarly,  the  first 
term  on the  right  side of (10) is the  lender’s  expected 
intertemporal  marginal  rate  of  substitution.  The 
second  term  contains  ~1, the  Lagrange  multiplier  on 
the  constraint,  yi  -8110.  If ~1 >O,  this  constraint 
is  binding,  and  the  borrower’s  expected  marginal 
intertemporal  rate  of substitution  is strictly  less than 
the  lender’s.  This  means  that  the  borrower  would 
like  to  obtain  more  period  1  consumption  in  ex- 
change  for period  2 consumption,  but  cannot  do  so 
in  any  feasible  contract.  In  this  sense,  one  might 
describe  such  a borrower  as constrained  or rationed.  l2 
and 
PbLUd(y”)  -  ~BUd(&  -  ydh, 
=-  UEwn+1  -Y&n+1  5  0. 
Unless  un  is  linear,  these  two  conditions  together  imply  that 
y,,  >  y,-1,  but  this  contradicts  the  initial  supposition  that  the 
opposite  was  true.  Thus,  a contingent  contract  cannot  satisfy 
the  first-order  conditions  and  thus  cannot  be  optimal. 
I2 This  feature  of  the  model  is  an  exact  restatement  of  an 
argument  made  by Irving  Fisher  (1930,  pp.  210-l  1). He  noted 
that  a borrower’s  collateral  will limit  the  amount  he can  borrow, 
and  “Ii]n  consequence  of  this  limitation  upon  his  borrowing 
power,  the  borrower  may  not  succeed  in modifying  his  income 
stream  sufficiently  to bring  his rate  of preference  for present  over 
future  income’down  to  agreement  with  the  rate  or  rates  of 
interest  ruling  in  the  market”  (p.  211). 
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As a model  of debt  contracts,  there  is an obvious 
deficiency  in  the  optimal  contract  just  described: 
nothing  ever  occurs  that  resembles  a default,  a state 
in which  something  less  than  the  fixed  payment,  R, 
is made.  The  optimal  contract  is a constant  payment, 
and  thus  is perfectly  risk-free.  Many  debt  contracts 
are virtually  risk-free,  but  it seems  that  in most  debt 
arrangements  there  appears  to  be  at least  a remote 
possibility  of default.  This  possibility  is an important 
feature  of the  contractual  arrangement,  even  if the 
probability  is small,  because  a borrower  will always 
be  tempted  to  simulate  default.  Apparently  the 
environment  described  above  is incompatible  with 
payments  that  are almost  always  a fixed  amount  but 
occasionally  are less. l3 Can  economic  environments 
be  found  that  display  such  contracts? 
To  guide  a search  for  such  environments,  let  us 
begin  by  asking  what  happens  when  an  individual 
defaults  on  an  actual  debt  contract.  First,  and  ob- 
viously,  the  borrower  pays  less  at a given  date  than 
was  stipulated  under  the  original  contract.i4  This  is 
not  all that  happens,  however.  If the  loan  is explic- 
itly  collateralized  the  borrower  may  be  forced  to 
surrender  the  collateral.  Under  an “unsecured”  obli- 
gation  the  borrower  may  agree  to  a  restructured 
payment  schedule,  promising  to  make  future 
payments  in lieu of the  current  payment.  Sometimes 
the  borrower  is  forced  into  legal  bankruptcy  pro- 
ceedings,  which  often  involve  liquidating  assets  and 
using  the  proceeds  to  repay  claims.  For  managers 
of  incorporated  businesses,  bankruptcy  involves  at 
least  temporary  surrender  of  some  control  rights 
associated  with  the  business,  because  the  bank- 
ruptcy  court  or  the  trustee  can  assume  substantial 
power  over  management  decisions.  The  bankrupt 
that  is  not  liquidated  often  must  agree  to  a  set  of 
restructured  claims,  as in Chapter  11 reorganizations 
or  Chapter  13 “wage-earner  plans”  under  the  U.S. 
Bankruptcy  Code.  These  outcomes  are  obviously 
interrelated,  but  the  salient  point  is that  usually  the 
borrower  surrenders  something  distinct  from  the 
originally  promised  payment:  either  money  at a later 
date  or  some  other  asset  or  right. 
‘3 Indeed,  results  like those  in Section  II have been  widely  known 
for  some  time,  so  perhaps  the  central  problem  posed  by  debt 
contracts  is reconciling  the  predominantly  noncontingent  nature 
of  the  contract  with  occasional  contingent  payments. 
I4 I  neglect  here  the  phenomenon  of  “technical  default,”  a 
common  provision  in  many  contemporary  debt  contracts,  in 
which  the  borrower  has  made  all  requisite  payments  but  has 
violated  some  auxiliary covenants.  Covenants  are important,  but 
I have  nothing  new  to  say  about  them  and  focus  here  entirely 
on  default  in  the  sense  of  payment  deficiency. 
One  is thus  led to consider  contracts  in a multiple- 
good  environment,  one  in which  the  borrower  has 
more  than  one  good  to  sacrifice.  In  such  a setting 
a contract  specifies  a payment  schedule  for each  good 
the  borrower  will  later  have  available.  In  principle 
each  payment  schedule  can  be  an arbitrary  function 
of  future  circumstances.  A  debt  contract  in  this 
setting  is  a  set  of  payment  schedules  with  special 
properties.  First,  in  almost  all circumstances  fiied 
noncontingent  amounts  of  a set  of goods  are  paid, 
fixed  sums  of  money  at  prespecified  dates,  for  ex- 
ample.  Second,  in some  circumstances  less  of these 
goods  is paid  and  positive  quantities  of some  other 
goods  are surrendered,  where  “other  goods”  must  be 
interpreted  broadly  to  include  legal  claims  and  the 
like,  as  described  above. 
Under  what  circumstances  would  such  a  debt 
contract  be optimal?  Let  us abstract  from  multiperiod 
debt  contracts  that  stipulate  a series  of payments  and 
focus  attention  on  an  obligation  to  make  a  single 
specified  payment  at a single  future  date.  Consider 
first  the  set of states  in which  the  borrower  pays  the 
fixed  amount  of  the  good-call  it  money  for  now. 
Perhaps  the  noncontingent  nature  of  the  payment 
schedule  over  these  states  can  be  motivated  in 
exactly  the  same  way  as the  noncontingent  contract 
of the  previous  section;  if the  borrower  could  hide 
resources  ex post,  the  payment  schedule  would  have 
to  be  constant  to  avoid  giving  the  borrower  an  in- 
centive  to  hide. 
Now  consider  the  default  states  in  which  some 
other  goods  are  paid.  The  fixed  payment  might  be 
larger  than  the  smallest  possible  amount  of money 
the  borrower  could  have  available.  When  the  bor- 
rower  does  not have enough  money  to make  the fured 
payment,  the  actual  payment  is obviously  limited  by 
the  amount  of money  the  borrower  has.  What  is to 
keep  the  borrower  from  always  feigning  these  out- 
comes  so as to make  the  smallest  possible  payment? 
With  other  goods  available,  the  contract  could  re- 
quire  that  if the  borrower  makes  less  than  the  fixed 
money  payment,  then  some  other  goods  of  equal 
value  to  the  borrower  must  be  transferred  to  the 
lender  as well. The  other  goods  sacrificed  are enough 
to  dissuade  the  borrower  from  pretending  to  be 
destitute.  Thus  the  transfer  of other  “collateral” goods 
ensures  that  the  borrower  will  not  falsely  claim  to 
be  unable  to  make  the  full  payment. 
Such  an  arrangement  could  expand  dramatically 
the  set  of feasible  contracts  available  to the  borrower 
and lender.  In the  environment  described  in Section 
III,  where  no  other  goods  were  present,  the  lowest 
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size of the fixed payment.  With  other  goods  available, 
a  contract  can  be  written  with  a fixed  payment  of 
money  that  is  larger  than  the  smallest  amount  the 
borrower  might  possess  ex  post.  The  other  goods 
provide  a way  of  relaxing  the  sharp  constraint  im- 
posed  by  the  value  of the  smallest  possible  harvest 
outcome  in  the  environment  of  Section  II. 
But other  puzzles  arise in this  story.  Consider  first 
the  set  of  states  in  which  a noncontingent  amount 
of money  is paid.  Why,  in these  circumstances,  pay 
money  rather  than  some  other  goods,  such  as those 
paid  in  the  default-like  states?  It  must  be  because 
money,  at least  in those  states,  is more  valuable  to 
the  lender  than  the  other  goods,  or,  equivalently,  the 
other  goods  are  more  valuable  to  the  borrower, 
relative  to  money,  than  they  are to  the  lender.  This 
seems  like  a  reasonable  condition,  one  that  might 
be  satisfied  in many  of the  circumstances  in which 
debt  contracts  appear.  When  a  consumer  buys  a 
house  or  a car,  say,  it is less  valuable  to  the  lender, 
relative  to  money,  than  it  is  to  the  borrower;  the 
lender  would  obtain  less  money  by  repossessing  the 
collateral  and selling it than  the borrower  would  spend 
to  retain  it.  Consumers  quite  plausibly  could  value 
a good  at more  than  its  market  price  if it is indivisi- 
ble and  consumers  only  buy  one.  Similarly,  the  value 
to  the  borrower  of all that  is forfeited  in bankruptcy 
settlements  of various  types  is usually  less  than  the 
value  of what  is received  by lenders.  Indeed,  the  dif- 
ference,  regarded  as  a “deadweight  loss,”  seems  to 
motivate  a wide  array  of arrangements-both  in and 
out  of formal  bankruptcy  proceedings-designed  to 
minimize  this  loss. 
The  other  goods  serve  as collateral. This  is most 
plain  in  loans  explicitly  collateralized  by  physical 
goods  such  as land,  structures,  chattels,  automobiles, 
or inventories.  Often  a loan  is collateralized  by finan- 
cial instruments  such  as accounts  receivable,  ware- 
use  receipts  or negotiable  securities.  Many  debts  are 
implicitly  collateralized,  as  when  income  or 
profits  in  the  more  distant  future  stand  behind  a 
promise  to make  a payment  out  of income  or profits 
in the  near  future,  or when  claims  to a portion  of the 
proceeds  of  liquidation  stand  behind  an  unsecured 
corporate  obligation.  Even  an unsecured  creditor  can 
obtain  a judgement  against  a defaulting  debtor,  allow- 
ing  the  creditor  to  have  the  debtor’s  assets  seized 
to  satisfy  the  claim.  While  the  distinctions  between 
these  various  means  of collateralizing  an  obligation 
can  be  quite  important,  they  are  fundamentally 
similar.  Indeed,  in almost  all instances  the  nonpay- 
ment  of a contractual  obligation  provides  the  lender 
with  a  legal  claim,  the  content  of  which  is jointly 
determined  by  the  terms  of the  original  contract  and 
the  existing  body  of  contract  and  bankruptcy  law. 
While  the  resulting  claim  can  have  a wide  range  of 
characteristics,  it  provides  the  borrower  with  an 
incentive  to make  the  stipulated  payment  whenever 
possible,  to  “keep  his  heart  right”  in  the  words  of 
a practitioner.15  The  role  of  collateral  is not neces- 
sarily  to  indemnify  the  lender  against  potential  loss, 
although  it certainly  does  so to a degree.  Rather,  col- 
lateral  is a means  of satisfying  incentive  constraints 
that  ensure  voluntary  compliance  with  the  terms  of 
the  loan  agreement. 
The  main  legal  distinction  between  an  explicitly 
collateralized  debt  and an uncollateralized  debt  is how 
the  claim  stands  vis-a-vis  third  parties  such  as other 
creditors  or a bankruptcy  trustee.  For  example,  under 
the  current  U.S.  law governing  secured  transactions 
the  difference  between  secured  and  unsecured 
creditors  is minor  when  there  is only  one  creditor.16 
A creditor  with  a collateralized  debt  can  obtain  the 
collateral  to satisfy  the  claim,  rather  than  see  the  col- 
lateral  added  to  the  pool  of assets  divided  among  all 
of the  creditors  in bankruptcy.  This  suggests  that  the 
essential  role  of explicit,  as opposed  to implicit,  col- 
lateral is related  to multilateral  financial arrangements, 
and  that  uncollateralized  lending  has  much  in com- 
mon  with  explicitly  collateralized  lending.  l7 
IV. COLLATERALIZEDDEBT 
In  this  section  I  describe  a  two-good  economic 
environment,’  and  I  find  conditions  under  which  a 
collateralized  debt  contract  is optimal  for the  reasons 
described  above.  The  environment,  an extension  of 
the previous  example,  captures  the  essential  elements 
of  the  argument  outlined  above.‘8 
I5 This  role was  noted  by Barro (1976).  The  quoted  practitioner 
is  Chris  Carlson,  Richmond,  VA. 
l6 One  exception  is when  the  collateral is an “exempt  asset” under 
bankruptcy  law, and  is thus  out of reach  of any unsecured  creditor 
but  can be recovered  under  a collateralized  loan.  Exempt  assets 
include  the  debtor’s  “tools  of  trade,”  some  of  the  debtor’s 
household  goods,  and  an  interest  in  the  debtor’s  residence. 
Another  exception  is when  the  collateral  is an asset  that  will not 
pass  to the  bankruptcy  estate,  such  as the  personal  assets  of the 
manager  of  a corporation. 
I7 Standard  terminology  in  the  theoretical  finance  literature, 
unfortunately,  is that  a debt  contract  like  the  one  described  in 
Section  II is “uncollateralized”  while  a debt’ contract  like the  one 
described  below  is “collateralized.”  The  literature  treats  collateral 
as  if  it  were  exempt  assets  in  a  personal  bankruptcy,  or  the 
personal  assets  of  a  manager  in  a corporate  bankruptcy. 
I8 The  model  is a simplified  version  of my  1991 working  paper. 
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which  to  conceivably  repay  a loan  in  the  fall.  One 
good  is the  fall harvest,  as before,  and the  other  good 
can be thought  of as chattels: durable,  portable,  per- 
sonal  property  such  as clothes,  furniture  or perhaps 
tools.  In a collateralized debt contract, when  the 
harvest  is sufficient  the  borrower  pays  a fixed,  non- 
contingent  amount  of  the  harvest  (the  payment 
good)  and  none  of  the  chattels  (the  collateral 
good). When  the  fall harvest  is less  than  the  fixed 
payment,  the  entire  harvest  is  given  to  the  lender 
along  with  a positive  quantity  of chattels.  For  good 
harvests  the  borrower  does  not  hide  the  harvest 
because  some  of the  chattels  would  have  to  be  sur- 
rendered  as  well. 
To  proceed  formally,  then,  let  good  1  in  each 
period  be  the  wheat  harvest,  as  in  the  previous 
models,  and  let  good  2 be  the  collateral  good,  the 
borrower’s  chattels.  The  borrower  is endowed  with 
k units  of chattels,  and  k is known  ahead  of time  to 
both  the  borrower  and  the  lender.  In the  event  that 
the  fall harvest  is B,,, the  borrower  makes  payments 
of yin  of good  1 and  yz,,  of good  2,  and  consumes 
8,  -yin  of good  1 and  k -  yz,  of good  2.  As before, 
the  spring  loan  advance  is q,  so  that  the  consump- 
tion  of  the  borrower  is  q,  and  the  consumption  of 
the  lender  is e? -q,  the  lender’s  spring  endowment 
minus  the  loan advance.  For  simplicity,  I assume  that 
the  borrower  derives  utility  from  consumption  of 
chattels  only  in  the  fall. 
The  expected  utilities  of the  two  agents  are  now 
uB(q)  +  &uB&-yin)  +  Vdk-y2n)hn  (11) 
and 
u&I  -4)  +  On!,  Myd  +  v~(y2dh~.  (12) 
I  have  assumed  here  that  both  agents  have  addi- 
tively  separable  utility  in the  fall.  The  functions  VB 
and VL  are the  utilities of the borrower  and the  lender, 
respectively,  with  respect  to  chattels.  I assume  that 
both  are continuous,  concave  and  smoothly  differen- 
tiable.  A  natural  assumption  to  make  is  that  VB  is 
strictly  increasing,  but  VL need  not  be  increasing. 
The  function  VL might  be decreasing  if the  collateral 
good  is worthless  to  the  lender  and  disposing  of  it 
is costly,  or if yz,  is viewed  as a costly  punishment, 
such  as  debtor’s  prison.i9 
19  Diamond  (1984)  displays  a model  of optimal  debt  contracts 
that  depends  on  nonpecuniary  punishment  of the  borrower  in 
the  event  of  nonpayment.  His  model  is  a  special  case  of  the 
model  described  here. 
The  resource  feasibility constraints  extend  naturally 
to  this  case: 
9  2  0,  (13) 
4  2  9,  (14) 
yin  1  09  n=l,Z  ,..., N,  (13 
en  2  yin,  n=  1,2 ,..., N,  (16) 
y2n  2  0  n=  1,2 ,..., N,  (17) 
k  2  y2m  n=l,Z  ,..., N.  (18) 
A contract is now  a loan  advance,  q,  and  a pair  of 
payment  schedules,  {yll,yl2,...,ylN}  and  (~21, 
y22,...,  yzN},  that  determine  the  payments  of  good 
1  and  good  2,  respectively,  for  each  harvest.  As 
before,  contracts  might  in general  give  the  borrower 
an  incentive  to  hide  some  of  the  harvest  in  some 
states,  but,  as  before,  we  can  restrict  attention  to 
contracts  for  which  the  borrower  never  has  an 
incentive  to  hide.  Contracts  that  have  this  property 
satisfy  the  following  incentive  feasibility  constraints: 
uB(k  -  yld  +  VB(k  -5’2d 
2  uB(8n-ylm)  +  VB(k-J’2m) 
for  n =Z,...,N,  m=n-1.  (19) 
As  in  the  previous  model,  I  have  written  the  con- 
straint  only  in terms  of the  temptation  of displaying 
the  next  smallest  possible  harvest  0n-i.20 
Optimal  contracts  can  again  be found  as the  solu- 
tion  to a programming  problem,  parallel  to  Problem 
2.  An  optimal  contract  is  a  set  of  numbers 
{q,y11,y12  ,...,  ylN,y21,y22,...,y2N}  that  solve 
Problem  3: 
Maximize,  by  choice  of 
hBUB(q)  +  hBfln~l[UB@n-yld  +  VB(k-Y2n)I~n 
+  XLudek-q)  +  XLfln~l[UL(yln)  +  vL(y2n)lan 
20  The  simple  argument  used  in  Section  II to justify  restricting 
attention  to adjacent  incentive  constraints  does  not  apply  in the 
two-good  environment  here.  The  approach  is valid  nonetheless 
because  I  merely-want  to  show  that  a  particular  candidate 
contract  is  optimal.  The  set  of  contracts  that  satisfy  global 
incentive  feasibility  constraints  is contained  in the  larger  set  of 
contracts  that  satisfy  the  weaker  local  constraints  in  (19).  The 
candidate  contract  can  be  shown  to  satisfy  global  incentive 
feasibility,  so if it is optimal  relative  to contracts  satisfying  (19) 
then  it  is  optimal  relative  to  the  smaller  set  of  contracts  that 
satisfies  global  incentive  feasibility  constraints. 
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(13)-( 18) and  the  incentive  feasibility 
(19).2’ 
The  Collateralized  Debt  Contract 
constraints 
constraints 
Under  what  conditions,  then,  does  a  collateral- 
ized  debt  contract  solve  Problem  3? To  answer  this 
question  I need  to  state  precisely  what  constitutes 
a collateralized  debt  contract.  To  start,  the  payment 
schedule  for  good  1 is 
yzn  =  yin(R)  G  MlN[&,,R].  cm 
A  fixed,  noncontingent  amount  R  is  transferred, 
unless  the  harvest  is too  small  and  8,  <  R,  in which 
case  the  entire  crop  is  transferred.  I have  in  mind 
contracts  in  which  R  >  81,  contracts  that  were 
not  incentive  feasible  in the  earlier  model  with  just 
one  repayment  good.  Figure  4(a)  portrays  a typical 
payment  schedule  for good  1. For  future  reference, 
define  r  as  the  largest  index  number  for  which 
8,s R.22 
To  complete  the  description  of  a  typical  col- 
lateralized  debt  contract,  I  need  to  specify  the 
schedule  of transfers  of chattels,  the  collateral  good. 
I apply  two  guiding  principles:  first,  ensure  incen- 
tive  feasibility  of the  resulting  contract;  and  second, 
minimize  the  consumption  of  the  borrower’s  chat- 
tels  by  the  lender.  T?ws, the chanelspayment schedul’e 
is rbe minimal  scbeduk hut ensums  t/rat  he  bonvwer does 
not  have an incenhe  to  chat and hi& some  of the  Amwest. 
The  schedule  is constructed  recursively  starting  with 
the  payment  y&r, for the  largest  harvest,  and  work- 
ing down  to y&,  the payment  for the  smallest  harvest, 
with  the  payment  set  at each  step  to  ensure  that  the 
incentive  feasibility  constraint  for  that  harvest  out- 
come  is met  with  equality.  First,  the  payment  y& 
can  be  set  freely,  so  to  minimize  the  payment  for 
this  harvest  outcome  set  y;N  = 0.  Now  for any  arbi- 
trary  m  <  N,  assume  that  the  chattels  payment 
schedule  has  already  been  determined  for 
n=m+l  , . . . ,N.  The  incentive  feasibility  constraint 
relating  the  payments  y&  and  yin,  for  n = m + 1,  is 
UB@n  -yW  +  Vdk  -yin)  1  UB@n  -yim) 
+  VB(k  -Y2m),  n=m+l.  (21) 
21 Problem  3 is convex  under  the  additional  assumption,  which 
I now  make,  that  -uS(&)/urj(&),  the  coefficient  of absolute 
risk  aversion  of  the  borrower  with  respect  to  good  1,  is  non- 
increasing.  Under  this  condition  the  set  of  utilities  that  satisfy 
feasibility  constraints  is convex  (even  though  the  constraints  are 
not  convex  in  the  choice  variables). 
** Therefore,  R  is contained  in the  half-open  interval  [C&9,  + 1). 
If yzm, payment  of chattels  from  the  borrower  to the 
lender,  is so  small  that  (21)  is violated,  then  when 
the  harvest  is  8,  the  borrower  has  an  incentive  to 
lie  to  make  the  payments  yim  and  yzm rather  than 
yin  and  yin.  If  yam is  so  large  that  (21)  is  a  strict 
inequality,  then  the  chattels  payment  could  be 
reduced  without  violating  incentive  feasibility. 
Choose  for yim the  smallest  value  of yzm that  satisfies 
(2 1). For each harvest outcome,  the chattels  payment is 
the snzallest  possible amount that does not give the bor- 
rower an incentive to lie. 
The  specific  shape  of  a typical  chattels  payment 
schedule  is shown  in Figure  4(b).  For  On >  R,  the 
crop  payment  is the  constant,  R,  so for m  >  r, (21) 
reduces  to  vu(k  -yin)  >vu(k  -yz,).  Because  yiN = 
0, we can  set y&  =  0 for all m  >  r. In other  words, 
for  harvests  greater  than  R,  the  chattels  payment  is 
zero.  For  m =r,  (21)  as  an  equality  is 
UB@+l  -R)  +  VB(k)  =  LIB&+  1 -&I 
+  Vdk  -  $1).  (W 
This  equation  determines  yi,.  For  harvests  8,<8, 
(so  that  m<r),  (21)  as  an  equality  isa3 
UB(~)  +  vB(k-y&J 
=  UB&-8m)  +  VB(k-y;m), 
where  n=m+l.  (23) 
The  left  side  of  (23)  is  the  borrower’s  utility  when 
the  harvest  is Bn  = 8,+  1 and  he pays  yin = 8,  and yin. 
The  right  side  of (23)  is the  borrower’s  utility  when 
the  harvest  is 8, =em+ 1 and  he  instead  pretends  8, 
has  occurred  and  pays  yim =8,  and  yim.  The  chat- 
tels  payment  for  harvest  8,,  y&,  is set  so  that  the 
borrower  is just  indifferent  between  these  two  alter- 
natives.  Note  that  the  largest  transfer  of the  collateral 
good  is  yir,  and  occurs  for  the  smallest  possible 
harvest,  81. 
To  summarize,  a  collateralized  debt  contract  is 
described  by (20) and  (2 1). For  harvests  greater  than 
R,  the  borrower  transfers  a fixed  amount,  R,  of the 
crop,  and none  of the  chattels.  For  harvests  less than 
R,  the  borrower  transfers  all of the  crop  and  some 
amount  of the  chattels;  just  enough,  for each  harvest, 
to  dissuade  the  borrower  from  falsely  claiming  that 
that  harvest  has  occurred  if the  harvest  is  actually 
larger. 
23  This  equation  uses  the  facts  that  for  m<r  and  n =m  + 1, 
0,-yi,,=&-t&=0,  and  en-yi,=Bn-8,=8,+,-Bm. 
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A  TYPICAL  COLLATEBALIZED  DEBT  CONTRACT 
Y2n 
I  I  . 
4  R  eN  e 
(a)  Wheat  Payment 
The  borrower’s  collateral,  k, can  sharply  constrain 
feasible  contracts,  because  a contract  cannot  require 
transfer  of  more  collateral  than  the  borrower  actu- 
ally  has.  The  constraint  that  the  largest  collateral 
transfer  yir  not  exceed  k  is  analogous  to  the  con- 
straint  in the  model  of Section  II that  the  fixed  pay- 
ment  not  exceed  the  smallest  possible  harvest;  it 
places  an upper  limit on the  amount  of the  fured pay- 
ment  R.  Although  collateral  can  allow  payment 
schedules  which  would  otherwise  be infeasible,  feasi- 
ble  payment  schedules  could  still be  constrained.z4 
Optimality of a Collateralized  Debt Contract 
The  next  task  is  to  examine  the  first-order 
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  Problem  3, 
and  to  see  whether  the  collateralized  debt  contract 
just  described  can  satisfy  those  conditions.  The 
objective  is to identify  conditions  on the  agent’s utility 
functions,  the  endowments,  and  the  probability 
distribution  governing  the  harvest  that  allow  the 
collateralized  debt  contract  to  satisfy  the  first-order 
conditions. 
One  condition  that  is required  for a collateralized 
debt  contract  to  be  optimal  is that  the cofiateralgood 
must  be more vahabl’e at the  margin to the borrower  than 
to the lender: 
V$  (k  -  yin)  VL!  (Yin) 
u$&  -yin)  ’  ut(yin)  ’  (24) 
z4 One  can  easily  derive  an  equation  linking  the  two  agents’ 
expected  intertemporal  marginal  rates  of substitution  in this  case, 
analogous  to (lo),  but  with  the  Lagrange  multiplier  on the  con- 
straint  yzl<  k  playing  the  role  of  11. 
(b)  Chattels  Payment 
or,  upon  rearranging, 
urJ(Yin)  Vi(Yin)  ,  0 
u$(en-yin)  -  v$(k-yin)  -  . 
(25) 
The  two  ratios  in  (24)  measure  the  marginal  value 
of the  collateral  good  relative  to the  harvest  good  for 
each  agent.  The  inequality  (24)  states  that  the 
marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  chattels  and 
wheat  is larger  for the  borrower  than  for the  lender. 
Indifference  curves  that  satisfy  (24)  are shown  in an 
Edgeworth  Box  in Figure  5.  Imagine  increasing  the 
crop  payment,  yr,,  and  decreasing  the  chattels  pay- 
ment,  yzn,  by  infinitesimal  amounts  in  a way  that 
keeps  the  borrower  on the  same  indifference  curve. 
If (24)  holds  then  such  a move  along  the  borrower’s 
indifference  curve  (to the  northwest  in Figure  5) in- 
creases  the  lender’s  utility.  Thus  condition  (24)  states 
that,  ceteris  paribus,  giving  more  of the  crop  to  the 
lender  and  more  of the  chattels  to  the  borrower  can 
make  one of them  better  off without  making  the  other 
worse  off. 
A second  condition  for  a collateralized  debt  con- 
tract  to  be  optimal  is actually  a strengthening  of the 
first  condition;  th  direct benefi  of giving mope  cn$  to 
the  ,knh- and more  chaneh to th bonvwe mast  be greater 
than  the  cost of  th  second-order efsect on  incentive 
constraints: 
[ 
ur!(yin)  vi(yin) 1 
u$&-yin)  -  vd(k-yin) 
X~fl~n -  An 1  0,  (26) 
where  An  E 
-Yi 
4n+19(27) 
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INDIFFERENCE  CURVES 
THAT  SATISFY  CONDITION  (24) 
Consumption 
Origin  for 
Borrower’s 
Consumption 
and  where  &+I  is  the  nonnegative  Lagrange 
multiplier  on  the  incentive  feasibility  constraint  for 
harvest  &,+I.  The  bracketed  term  in  (26)  is identi- 
cal to  the  left  side  of (ZS),  and  measures  the  benefit 
of  giving  the  borrower  more  of  the  collateral  good 
and  less  of the  crop  when  the  harvest  is 8,.  Such  a 
reallocation  affects the  incentive  constraint  for harvest 
8,+ 1, and the  term  An is the  cost  associated  with  this 
effect.  If the  benefit  term  in (26)  is greater  than  the 
cost  term  A,,,  then  the  debt  contract  is  optimal. 
To  understand  the  cost  term  An,  again  imagine 
increasing  the  crop  payment  yin  and  decreasing  the 
chattels  payment  yzn  by  infinitesimal  amounts, 
giving  more  of the  payment  good  to  the  lender  and 
more  of the  collateral  good  to the  borrower,  in a way 
that  keeps  the  borrower  on  the  same  indifference 
curve.  In particular,  increase  yin to yin + E, for some 
very  small  E  > 0,  and  decrease  yin  to  yin -6,  SO  as 
to  keep  the  borrower  on  a  constant  indifference 
curve.  This  change  affects  the  borrower’s  incentive 
to  tell  the  truth  when  the  harvest  is  &,+I,  making 
it more  tempting  to  display  8,  and  make  the  corre- 
sponding  payments,  yin + E and yin -6.  Specifically, 
UB(b+l  -yin-E)  +  vg(k-yin+@  >  UB&-yin) 
+  VB(k-yin),  even  though  UB(8n-yin-E)  + 
VB(k  -yin  +6)  =  UB(8n  -yin)  +VB(k -yin)  by  con- 
struction.  The  change  in the  right  side  of the  incen- 
tive  constraint  for  harvest  en+1  [see  condition  (19)] 
is  approximately 
[u$(&-yzn)  -  u$(&+1  -Yin)16  G33) 
a nonnegative  quantity.  The  term  An is just  (28),  the 
amount  by which  the  state  n + 1 incentive  constraint 
is  tightened,  multiplied  by  &+  I,  the  Lagrange 
multiplier,  or “shadow  value” for that  constraint.  (The 
denominator  of A,, rescales  &+I  into  units  of state 
n utility.)  The  term  An represents  the  cost  of a move 
toward  the northwest  boundary  of the  Edgeworth  Box 
for state  n. Therefore,  condition  (26)  states  that  the 
gap between  the  borrower’s  and the  lender’s  marginal 
rate  of substitution  between  chattels  and wheat  must 
exceed  the  cost  of  an  indirect  effect  on  incentive 
constraints.ZS 
There  are  two  intuitive  ways  to  think  about  con- 
dition  (26).  First,  it  can  be  thought  of  as  a  lower 
bound  on  the  gap  between  the  borrower’s  and  the 
lender’s  valuation  of  the  collateral  good-the 
bracketed  term  in (26)-for  a given  value  of the  cost 
term  An. If the  gap is not  large enough,  the  debt  con- 
tract  is not  optimal  and the  best  arrangement  involves 
more  frequent  transfer  of the  chattels  to  the  lender. 
Alternatively,  condition  (26)  can  be  viewed  as  an 
upper  bound  on the  borrower’s  risk aversion,  because 
the  cost  term  An is approximately  proportional  to the 
borrower’s  coefficient  of absolute  risk  aversion.  The 
25 Notice  that  if UB  is linear,  so  that  the  borrower  is risk  neutral 
with  respect  to good  1, then  the  derivative  u$  is a constant,  An 
is zero,  and  (26)  is equivalent  to  (24).  For  very  small  values  of 
8 n+ 1  -O,,  A,, is approximately  proportional  to  -  u&$&)/u~(c$‘& 
the  coefficient  of  absolute  risk  aversion  of  the  borrower  with 
respect  to the  payment  good.  Thus  A,, is larger,  ceteris  paribus, 
, the  more  risk  averse  is  the  borrower. 
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ing  as  much  risk  as  he  would  like  with  the  lender, 
so  if the  borrower  is  very  risk  averse  the  value  of 
relaxing  an  incentive  constraint  is large.  If the  bor- 
rower  is too  risk  averse,  the  cost  of indirectly  tight- 
ening  the  incentive  constraints  outweighs  the  benefit 
of giving the  borrower  the  chattels,  and the  debt  con- 
tract  is  not  optimaLz6 
As mentioned  above,  collateral  is often  described 
as a means  of compensating  the  lender  for possible 
losses  in  default,  but  its  main  role  in  this  model  is 
to secure  compliance  with  the  debt  agreement.  The 
amount  of  collateral  transferred  for  a given  harvest 
is  just  enough  to  discourage  the  borrower  from 
pretending  a low harvest  has  occurred  when  it actu- 
ally  has  not.  Thus  to  the  borrower,  the  amount  of 
collateral  transferred  is equal  in value  to  the.short- 
fall in the  crop.  The  lender  is actually  worse  off when 
he  receives  collateral  than  when  the  full payment  is 
made,  because  the  collateral  is  worth  less  to  the 
lender  than  to the borrower,  relative  to the  crop.  The 
value  of  collateral  to  the  lender  does matter  for  the 
arrangement  because,  the  more  the  lender  values  the 
collateral,  the  lower  the  interest  rate  the  lender  will 
require.z7 However,  the primary  function  of collateral 
here  is  to  keep  the  borrower  honest. 
V.  RELATEDLITERATUREON 
DEBTCONTRACTS 
Kenneth  Arrow  (1974),  in  his  1973  Presidential 
Address  to the American  Economics  Association,  first 
suggested  that  private  information  might  be why  non- 
contingent  contracts  are widely  observed.  This  idea 
arose  in  the  early  economics  literature  on  markets 
for insurance,  particularly  medical  insurance,  in which 
the  absence  of  insurance  arrangements  was  traced 
to the  nonobservability  of some  key  aspect  of future 
outcomes  (see  Arrow,  1963,  and  Spence  and  Zeck- 
hauser,  1971).  This  observation  has long been  taken 
for  granted  in  the  insurance  industry  itself.  For 
example,  an insurance  textbook  (Angell,  1959) states 
that  one  requirement  for a hazard  to  be  insurable  is 
z6 This  reasoning  is  only  heuristic,  because  independently 
varying,  say,  the  lender’s  valuation  of  the  collateral  good  will 
affect  the  cost  term  as well via the  multiplier  &+I.  Nonetheless, 
parametric  examples  can  easily  be  constructed  that  match  the 
intuition  in  the  text.  Also,  one  can  easily  obtain  an  explicit 
expression  for  4.  in  terms  of  the  primitive  elements  of  the 
environment. 
27  The  interest  rate  on  a loan  is just  R/q  -  1. I have  in  mind  a 
setting  in which  the  lender  compares  the  total  return  from  the 
loan contract  to returns  on alternative  uses  of funds,  so the  more 
valuable  the  collateral  the  smaller  R  has  to  be. 
that  “[i]t  must  be  difficult  or  impossible  for  the 
insured  to  pretend  that  he  has  suffered  a loss  when 
he  has  not  done  so.” 
Many  recent  papers  have  proposed  explanations 
for  debt  contracts  with  occasional  default.  Douglas 
Diamond  (1984)  described  a model  of debt  contracts 
based  on  private  information  about  the  borrower’s 
resources,  as here,  and based  on the idea that  a lender 
can  impose  “nonpecuniary  penalties”  on  a borrower 
in the  event  of  default.  The  amount  of the  penalty 
varies  with  the  borrower’s  reported  resources,  and 
is set  optimally  to ensure  that  the  borrower  does  not 
have  an incentive  to lie. Diamond’s  model  is virtually 
a special  case  of the  model  presented  above;  the  sur- 
render  of collateral  serves  as a penalty  in my  model, 
and  the  collateral  good  can  be  interpreted  quite 
broadly  as any  action  that  reduces  the  utility  of the 
borrower.  Thus  the  model  presented  above  unifies 
the  treatment  of collateral  and penalties  in loan  con- 
tracts,  and  highlights  their  essential  similarity. 
An  alternative  model  of  debt  contracts  was  first 
proposed  by Robert  Townsend  (1979)  and  is based 
on  the  idea  that  the  lender  might  be  able  to  verify 
the borrower’s  report  at a cost.  If the borrower  reports 
a small  harvest,  the  lender  verifies  the  amount  of the 
harvest  and the  borrower  makes  an agreed-upon  pay- 
ment.  When  the  borrower’s  harvest  is sufficient  to 
make  the  full payment,  no  verification  takes  place. 
The  borrower  never  cheats,  because  verification 
would  occur  and  he would  be  discovered.  The  debt 
contract  is optimal  in such  an environment  because 
it minimizes  the  frequency  of costly  verification.  The 
logic is closely  parallel  to that  of the  model  presented 
in  this  article.  In  both  models,  default  involves 
deadweight  loss-the  transfer  of  collateral  to  the 
lender  in  my  model  and  verification  in  the  costly 
verification  model-and  the  optimal  contract  seeks 
to  minimize  the  cost. 
Unfortunately,  debt  contracts  are  only  optimal  in 
the  costly  verification  model  in  the  presence  of  an 
ad hoc  restriction  on  contractual  arrangements.  For 
each  possible  report  by  the  borrower,  a  contract 
specifies  that  the  lender  either  verifies  or  does 
not.  More  generally,  a  contract  could  specify  that 
for  a  given  report  the  lender  verifies  with  some 
probability,  not  necessarily  equal  to  zero  or  one.  A 
detemintitic contract is  one  in  which  verification 
probabilities  are  all  either  zero  or  one,  while  a 
randomized  contract  is one  in which  some  verification 
probabilities  are  between  zero  and  one.  In  the 
costly  verification  model,  debt  contracts  are optimal 
only  when  attention  is  restricted  to  deterministic 
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upon  the  debt  contract  with  a randomized  contract, 
and  when  randomized  contracts  are allowed  the  op- 
timal  contract  does  not,  in general,  resemble  debt. 
The  reason  is  that  when  verification  occurs  with 
positive  probability,  payments  can  be  contingent. 
Verifying  with  small  probabilities  over  a wide  range 
of harvest  outcomes  can provide  sufficient  incentives 
and  allow improved  risk-sharing,  while  incurring  less 
verification  costs  on  average.z8 
One  might  think  that  randomized  economic  ar- 
rangements  are  unrealistic,  and  that  there  must  be 
some  as yet  undiscovered  reason  why  such  arrange- 
ments  are undesirable,  but  the  possibility  of random- 
ization  must  be taken  seriously  in this context.  Many 
financial arrangements  actually do involve  randomized 
audits,  especially  when  one  firm  acts  as an agent  for 
another  and  has  the  opportunity  to  hide  resources. 
The  models  presented  above  do not  rely on a restric- 
tion  to  deterministic  arrangements.z9 
Michael  Jensen  and  William  Meckling  (1976) 
observed  that  because  debt  contracts  force  the  bor- 
rower  to  bear  all of the  risk,  he  has  more  incentive 
than  he  would  under  a risk-sharing  arrangement  to 
take  costly,  private,  ex  ante  actions  that  affect  his 
return.  This  has  led  some  to  suggest  that  perhaps 
debt  is  selected  over  other  feasible  contingent  ar- 
rangements  because  it provides  superior  incentives 
to  the  borrower  to  take  appropriate  ex  ante  actions 
(see  Innes,  1990).  Unfortunately,  if one  assumes  that 
the  return  is freely  observable  by the  lender  ex post, 
then  the  debt  contract  is optimal  only  for very  special 
assumptions  about  preferences  and  technology,  and 
under  strong  restrictions  on  available  contracts.30  If 
instead  one  assumes  that  the  return  is unobservable, 
then,  as in Section  II above,  risk-free  debt  contracts 
are optimal,  independent  of the  ex ante  action  choice. 
Two  recent  papers,  by Oliver  Hart  and John  Moore 
(1989)  and  by  Charles  Kahn  and  Gur  Huberman 
2s Townsend  (1979)  recognized  this  fact,  and  subsequent  re- 
search  has  shown  that  it is robust.  See,  for example,  Townsend 
(1988). 
29 No  verification  is  allowed  in  the  models  in  this  paper,  as  if 
verification  is  prohibitively  costly,  so  the  issue  of  randomized 
verification  does  not  arise.  A distinct  but  related  issue  concerns 
randomized  payment  schedules,  which  for the  same  reasons  can 
in  some  cases  improve  upon  deterministic  arrangements.  One 
can  easily  show,  however,  that  randomized  arrangements  are 
never  needed  in  the  models  above. 
30  The  optimality  of the  debt  contract  in Innes  (1990)  requires 
risk  neutrality  and  restrictions  on  probability  distributions  and 
utilities  such  that  the  “monotone  likelihood  ratio  property”  holds 
and  effort  choice  is  unique.  In  addition,  only  nondecreasing 
payment  schedules  are  allowed. 
(1989),  focus  on renegotiation  in debt  contracts.  To 
motivate  debt  contracts  as an optimal  arrangement, 
they  assume  that  the  borrower’s  resources  are  ob- 
served  by  both  the  borrower  and  the  lender  but  are 
not  verifiable  by  a third  party  such  as  a court,  and 
thus  “enforceable”  contracts  cannot  be  made  con- 
tingent.  One  could  object  by noting  that  courts  often 
ascertain  litigants’  wealth,  and  often  enforce  highly 
contingent  contracts  such  as partnership  agreements. 
Although  a wide  range  of literature  examines  the 
effects  of debt  contracts  or the  choice  between  debt 
and  some  other  particular  contract,  the  form  of the 
contracts  available  to  agents  is  generally  taken  as 
given.  Thus  this literature  often  has little to say about 
why  contracts  are  limited  to  particular  forms. 
VI. SOMEPOLICY  IMPLICATIONS, 
BRIEFLYNOTED 
Recommended  public  policies  toward  credit 
markets  are often  predicated  on models  in which  debt 
contracts  play  a prominent  role,  and  so a model  that 
explains  debt  contracts  might  have  novel  policy  im- 
plications.  What  novel  prescriptions  for government 
credit  policy  might  be  suggested  by  the  model 
described  here?  A  complete  answer  is  beyond  the 
scope  of the  paper  and  is the  subject  of continuing 
research,  but  some  tentative  conclusions  are possible. 
Many  policy  prescriptions  are  sensitive  to  the 
assumption  that  capital  markets  are “perfect,”  mean- 
ing that  people  can  borrow  or lend  as much  as they 
like  on  the  same  terms.  For  example,  the  Ricardian 
Equivalence  Theorem  revived  by  Barro  (1974), 
which  states  that  under  certain  conditions  govern- 
ment  debt  policy  is irrelevant,  depends  critically,  as 
Barro noted,  on perfect  capital markets.  In the  model 
I presented  above,  the  capital  market  imperfection 
is  derived  endogenously  from  informational  con- 
straints,  but  a blanket  endorsement  of policy prescrip- 
tions  that  depend  on  capital  market  imperfections 
seems  unwarranted.  Rather,  one  needs  to assess  how 
the  informational  imperfection  affects  the  policy- 
maker’s  ability  to  improve  on private  arrangements; 
in some  cases the policymaker  may  be as sharply  con- 
strained  as  private  agents. 
One  category  of potentially  useful  measures  might 
be termed  “collateral  enhancement.”  I showed  above 
how  the  quantity  of  collateral  available  to  the  bor- 
rower  could  sharply  constrain  the  loan  contract. 
Under  current  U.S.  law,  there  are  limits  to  the  col- 
lateral  a consumer  can  offer;  one  cannot  offer  to  a 
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ment  of  a debt,  for  example.  Moreover,  under  the 
“fresh  start”  provision  of  the  Bankruptcy  Act  one 
cannot  waive  the  right  to discharge  unsatisfied  debts 
in bankruptcy.  Consumers  presumably  could  obtain 
more  credit  if they  could  offer  to  be  imprisoned  or 
could  waive  the  right  to  discharge  a debt,  because 
such  stiff  penalties  would  make  larger  repayments 
credible.  Interestingly,  debts  arising from government 
guaranteed  educational  loans  are  not  dischargeable 
in bankruptcy  during  the  first five years  following  the 
date  that  the  first payment  becomes  due  [ 11 U.S.C. 
5 523(a)(8)].  Th e  c aim  1  in bankruptcy  represented 
by  a guaranteed  student  loan  is thus  more  burden- 
some  than  a  dischargeable  claim,  and  presumably 
allows  improved  loan  terms  for the  borrower  or the 
lender.  The  analysis  of  the  present  paper  suggests 
that  allowing borrowers  to waive the right to discharge 
debts  in bankruptcy  might  improve  the  functioning 
of  credit  markets.  However,  there  might  be  com- 
pelling  countervailing  reasons  for the  prohibition  of 
waivers  of discharge  that  are not  taken  into  account 
by  the  models  presented  above;  see Jackson  (1985) 
for  a  discussion. 
Another  possible  rationale  for  government  credit 
policy  concerns  the  valuation  of collateral.  Suppose 
the  borrower  in the  model  described  above  faces two 
possible  lenders  who  differ  only  in  the  value  they 
place on the borrower’s  chattels.  The  optimal  arrange- 
ment  is for  the  borrower  to  obtain  a loan  from  the 
lender  who  values  the  collateral  good  most  highly, 
since  this  will  provide  the  borrower  with  a  lower 
interest  rate.  If,  for  some  reason,  a borrower’s  col- 
lateral  has  a social value  that  is higher  than  its private 
value  to lenders,  due  to an externality  of some  type, 
then  direct  government  lending  or government  loan 
guarantees  might  be  warranted.  To  justify  such 
policies  one would  have to argue that  the public valua- 
tion  of the  collateral  is higher  than  its highest  private 
valuation,  and  one  can legitimately  question  whether 
this  condition  holds  for many  current  loan-guarantee 
programs.31 
Beyond  these  simple  observations,  little  is known 
as yet  about  the  policy  implications  of  models  like 
31 William  Gale  (1990)  has  described  credit  market  models  in 
which  borrowers  have  private  information  beforehand  about  the 
riskiness  of their  future  resources.  He  shows  that  in such  models 
government  loan guarantees  targeted  to high-risk  borrowers  can 
imorove  efficiencv.  In  his  1991  oaner  he  aoolies  this  model  to 
exi’sting federal  credit  programs  and’calculates’that  policy  is likely 
to be quite  inefficient.  Debt  contracts  are assumed  in his model, 
rather  than  derived  endogenously,  and  it  is  unclear  how  the 
analysis  would  be  affected  by  the  latter. 
the  one  presented  above.  On  one  hand,  it is difficult 
to  imagine  policy  interventions  that  make  some 
people  better  off without  making  anyone  worse  off 
in this  type  of model,  other  than  the  two  just  men- 
tioned.  In particular,  based  on this model  alone  there 
does  not  seem  to  be  an efficiency  rationale  for loan 
subsidies  or more  general  interest  rate manipulations. 
Such  policies  could  have  important  consequences  for 
the  distribution  of welfare,  of course,  but  would  have 
to  be  evaluated  by  criteria  other  than  Pareto  opti- 
mality.  On  the other  hand,  the model  leaves out some 
features,  such  as  ex  ante  private  information,  that 
some  economists  claim  rationalize  credit  market  in- 
tervention.3z  The  claims  usually  pertain  to  markets 
that  are dominated  by  the  use  of debt  contracts,  and 
yet  the  claims  are  based  on  models  in  which  debt 
contracts  are  imposed,  rather  than  derived  as 
optimal.  It is not yet  known  whether  the  conclusions 
of those  models  would  survive  if they  were  modified 
so that  debt  contracts  arise  endogenously,  as in the 
model  I  have  presented  here. 
VII.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
So  why  is  there  debt  with  occasional  default? 
My  answer  has  two  components.  First,  borrowers 
can  fool  lenders  about  their  circumstances,  so 
having  the  borrower  share  risk with  the  lender  gives 
the  borrower  an  irresistible  temptation  to  cheat. 
Thus  payment  schedules  are noncontingent  in such 
situations.  Second,  if the  borrower  is  incapable  of 
making  the  stipulated  payment,  the  lender  has 
recourse  either  to  explicit  or  to  implicit  collateral. 
Such  recourse  is sufficient  to  dissuade  the  borrower 
from  withholding  payment. 
It is worth  pointing  out that  important  puzzles  con- 
cerning  debt  contracts  remain  unsolved.  The  sole 
source  of uncertainty  here  is the  borrower’s  future 
resources,  and  it seems  quite  reasonable  to  assume 
that  borrowers  can  hide  resources  from  lenders.  But 
much  of  the  uncertainty  that  faces  borrowers  and 
lenders  concerns  widely  observed  events  about  which 
neither  is  able  to  lie.  Examples  include  publicly 
known  prices  and  published  economic  data.  The 
theory  of Section  I predicts  that  repayment  contracts 
ought  to  be  contingent  on  many  publicly  observed 
events.  For  example,  officially  published  data  on 
average  prices  of consumer  goods  are  widely  avail- 
able,  and  are  closely  correlated  with  the  real  value 
32 See  Stiglitz  (1988). 
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creditors.  Why  are so few debt  contracts  indexed  for 
inflation? 
A second  puzzle  is perhaps  related  to  the  first.  A 
vast  literature  in monetary  economics  is motivated 
by the  observation  that  money  is widely  used  in spot 
exchanges  for goods.  And  yet,  almost  all debt  con- 
tracts  are  repaid  in  money  as  well.  Perhaps  the 
widespread  use  of  money  to  settle  debts  is  an 
equally important  puzzle.  The  model  described  above 
does  not  have  an explicit role for money,  but the  logic 
of  the  model  suggests  a  rudimentary  answer.  The 
borrower  might  have  some  sort  of advantage  relative 
to the  lender  in selling the  crop,  and therefore  returns 
money  rather  than  the  crop  itself to the  lender.  This 
answer  is rudimentary  because  it  does  not  explain 
just  why  the  borrower  would  have  such  an  advan- 
tage.  Evidently,  much  remains  to  be  learned  about 
financial  arrangements  such  as  debt  contracts. 
APPENDIX  A 
A  Derivation  of the Incentive Feasibility Constraints 
In  this  appendix  I show  that  any  pattern  of  con- 
sumptions  by  the  two  agents  that  can  be  achieved 
by any arbitrary  contract,  possibly  giving the borrower 
an incentive  to hide  the  harvest,  can  be achieved  by 
a contract  that  satisfies  the  incentive  feasibility  con- 
straints  and  does  not  give  the  borrower  an incentive 
to  hide  any  of the  harvest.  Therefore,  a given  con- 
sumption  pattern  can  be  achieved  if and  only  if it 
results  from  a  contract  that  satisfies  the  incentive 
feasibility  constraints.  The  argument  is presented  in 
the  model  of Section  II,  but  can  easily  be  extended 
to  cover  the  model  of  Section  IV. 
To  begin,  take  as  given  an  arbitrary  contract 
@lJlJZ,...,  ye},  that  satisfies  the  resource  feasibili- 
ty constraints  (13)-( 18), and consider  a given  harvest 
8,,  where  n >  1.  The  borrower  can  display  any 
harvest  &,,  where  m  can  equal  1,2 ,..., n,  and  m 
is  chosen  to  maximize  t&&-y,).  Define  yt:  as 
the  payment  the  borrower  actually  makes  after 
optimally  choosing  a  utility  maximizing  display.  It 
does  not  matter  if the  utility  maximizing  display  is 
not  unique,  because  the  utility  maximizing  payment 
is  always  unique.  The  payment  y:  clearly  satisfies 
u~(8~-y@~un(&-y~)  for  m=l,Z,...,n. 
Now  consider  an  arbitrary  harvest  Or,<&,  and 
define  y;  analogously  as the  utility  maximizing  pay- 
ment  for the  harvest  8,.  Clearly,  y;  =  ym for  some 
m  in  the  set  {1,2 ,..., p}.  Since  p<  n,  it  is also  true 
that  yi  =  ym for  some  m  in  the  set  {l,Z,...,n);  in 
other  words,  the  utility  maximizing  payment  for the 
harvest  8,  is a payment  that  could  have  been  made 
for  the  harvest  8,.  As  a result,  the  payment  y;  can 
provide  no  more  utility  when  the  harvest  is 8,  than 
the  utility  maximizing  payment  yi.  Therefore, 
uB(&-y;)  2  tin&-y;).  Since  both  n  and  p  are 
arbitrary,  this  condition  holds  for n = 2,. . . ,N,  and  for 
p=l  , . . . ,n -  1. These  are exactly  the  incentive  feasi- 
bility  constraints  (19). 
I have  defined  a set  of payments  {yi,yi,...,yk), 
the  utility  maximizing  payments  chosen  by  the  bor- 
rower  when  the  contract  is  {q,yr,yz,...,yN}.  Now 
define  a  new  contract  {q,yi  ,yi  ,.. .,yA},  by  substi- 
tuting  the  actual payments  for the  originally stipulated 
payments.  This  new  contract  satisfies  the  incentive 
feasibility  constraints,  and  thus  does  not  provide  any 
positive  incentive  to hide  harvest.  The  new  contract 
results  in consumption  patterns  for both  the  borrower 
and  the  lender  that  are  identical  to  those  resulting 
from  the  original  contract.  Because  the  original 
contract  is  arbitrary,  I  have  shown  that  any  con- 
sumption  patterns  that  can  be  achieved  can  also  be 
achieved  under  a  contract  that  provides  no  incen- 
tive  to  hide  the  harvest. 
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